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Abstract 
Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even 
in physics. This is due in large part to James Woodward’s influential argument that a wide 
range of explanations (including explanations in physics) are causal, based on his 
interventionist approach to causation. This article focuses on explanations, widespread in 
physics, involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, yet they do 
not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes. I argue that 





Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even 
in physics. In part this is because the major alternative, deductivist approaches to 
explanation, have fallen on hard times (Hempel 1965; Kitcher 1989). Problems of 
explanatory irrelevance and explanatory asymmetry (recall hexing spells and flagpoles) have 
motivated many to pay more attention to the role of causation in explanation. Preeminent 
among recent work on causal explanation is James Woodward’s influential argument that a 
wide range of explanations, including explanations in physics, are causal explanations, based 
on his interventionist approach to causation (Woodward 2003; Woodward 2007). After 
reviewing Woodward’s approach (Section 2), this paper argues that causal relations are 
insufficient for explanation because they do not account for the key feature of explanatory 
integration in physics (Section 3). Further, causal relations are unnecessary for explanations, 
widespread in physics, involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, 
yet they do not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes 
(Section 4). This constitutes a significant limitation on the scope of causal explanation in 
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physics that neither Woodward nor any other proponent of causal explanation has 
recognized. Causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as 
Woodward and others—such as Wesley Salmon, Phil Dowe and Michael Strevens—maintain 
(Salmon 1984; Dowe 2000; Strevens 2008). 
2. Woodward on causal explanation 
For Woodward, causal relations are captured in counterfactual claims about what would 
happen to an effect Y if an intervention on another variable (or set of variables) X were to 
occur. Causal explanations in turn appeal to these “interventionist” counterfactual 
dependencies. Woodward is clear that his account of causation is non-reductive, in the sense 
that it does not aim to give an account of causation exclusively in non-causal terms. 
Explanation is also non-reductive, for Woodward. He allows that not all causal explanations 
need be in terms of fundamental physics, and indeed that fundamental physics is an area in 
which explanations seem to be predominantly non-causal. He emphasizes that macro causal 
claims can often be more explanatory than causal claims about their micro realizers, and that 
these macro causal claims can be explanatory while offering only an approximate description 
of the relevant features of the target physical system. 
Consider an explanandum consisting of the statement that some variable Y takes a 
particular value. For Woodward, 
(1) [A] successful [causal] explanation will involve a generalization G [in the explanans] 
and explanans variable(s) X such that G correctly describes how the value of Y would 
change under interventions that produce a range of different values of X in different 
background circumstances (2003, 203). 
What makes the causal generalization G explanatory is that it can answer a relevant range of 
“what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and it does this by supporting the correct 
counterfactuals about what would happen under scientifically relevant interventions on the 
explanans variable X. To do this, G must be invariant (roughly, describe the same sort of 
dependence of Y on the X) under the relevant range of interventions and in a range of 
relevant background conditions. Unlike deductivist approaches, successful explanations are 
not just nomologically sufficient, that is, they cannot just subsume the explanandum under a 
regularity and thereby show it is to be expected given the truth of the statements in the 
explanans. Rather, they must also describe relevant dependency relations—they must show 
how this explanandum would change if the intervention or background conditions were to 
change. Explanation locates the explanandum within a space of relevant alternative possible 
explananda. 
We have seen that on Woodward’s account, causal explanation requires counterfactuals 
describing possible interventions and possible covariation in changes in the values of 
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variables, and a notion of scientifically relevant possibility guiding the selection of 
interventions, dependencies and alternative possible explananda. The other key component of 
his account, of course, is an account of causal relations, including the cause-effect relation 
between variable X in the explanans and Y in the explanandum. For Woodward, if some 
intervention on X produces a change in the value of Y, then X is a token direct cause of Y. 
Roughly speaking,  
(2) An intervention I is a hypothetical experimental manipulation on X such that,  
(i) I causes X, 
(ii) I changes the value of X in such a way that the value of X does not depend on the 
values of any other variables that cause X, and  
(iii) I changes the value of X in such a way that if any change occurs in the value of Y, 
it occurs only as the result of the change in X and not from some other source. 
(See Woodward 2003, 98-107 for a more detailed account.) Woodward’s notion of 
intervention is not limited to what humans can actually do with physical systems. Rather, it is 
defined in terms of possible or hypothetical manipulations of values of variables within a 
model. 
Woodward rightly emphasizes that only some changes in the explanans and only some 
contrasts between the explanandum and its alternatives are of causal and hence explanatory 
relevance. As he puts it, “It is also true that if a large meteor had struck my office just as I 
was typing these words, I would not have typed them, but again, we are reluctant to accept 
the failure of the meteor to strike as part of the explanation for my writing what I did” (2003, 
226). The problem here is not that causal omissions can never figure in genuine 
explanations—Woodward is clear that sometimes they can—but rather that in this context a 
meteor intervention is not what Woodward dubs a “serious possibility.” Scientists approach 
empirical phenomena with a large stock of shared beliefs about which of the interventions or 
dependency relations are potentially causally and explanatorily relevant, and which 
alternatives to the explanandum are relevant as well. Woodward is clear that what counts as a 
causal factor is relative to a particular choice of variables and also to a particular range of 
values of these variables (Woodward 2003, 55-56). Different models—in Woodward’s terms, 
different sets of structural equations, variables and directed graphs—result in a different set 
of causes and hence a different explanation.  
So far explanation, causation and intervention have been defined in terms of statements 
about variables, values and dependency relations within a model. But not every 
transformation or modification one can perform on a model corresponds to a hypothetical 
manipulation on the physical system itself (in Woodward’s sense), and only those that do so 
correspond can underwrite causal claims. Causation requires that the values and dependency 
relations of variables in the model represent physical features of the target system. As 
Woodward puts it, successful causal explanation requires that the statements (about 
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counterfactuals, dependency relations, values of variables, causal relations and so on) in the 
explanandum and in the explanans be true or approximately true of the target system (2003, 
203). Without the truth or approximate truth of the explanandum, it fails to be an explanation 
of any physical phenomenon at all. Without the truth or approximate truth of the explanans, 
the statements about the model simply cannot describe any real causal relations in the target 
system. 
For example, the period of a pendulum may be approximately derived and explained in 
terms of its length, in a fixed gravitational field, by appealing to counterfactual claims about 
the behaviour of an idealized pendulum model satisfying Galileo’s pendulum law. The law 
states that the period of a pendulum is proportional the square root of its length: 
(3) T α √l   
The relevant counterfactual claim is: if the length l were increased to l*, in a fixed 
gravitational field, then the period T of the model pendulum would have increased to T*, in 
accordance with (3). However, the model does not support an explanation of the length of the 
pendulum in terms of its period, because the relevant interventionist counterfactual is false of 
the model: it is false that if the period were increased to T*—for instance by moving the 
pendulum to a weaker gravitational field—the length of the pendulum would have changed. 
Woodward uses this example to illustrate how his causal model of explanation solves the 
problem of explanatory asymmetry that bedevils deductivist approaches (2003, 197). For our 
purposes, the important point is that the interventionist counterfactual doing the explanatory 
work (and described in the explanans) is true of the model and is also approximately true of 
the target system. For Woodward, the fact that the dependency relations in the model 
approximate “what the real dependency relations in the world actually are” is fundamental to 
his account of causal explanation (Woodward 2003, 202). 
3. Causal relations are insufficient for explanation 
I contend that a consequence of Woodward’s account is that causal relations are insufficient 
for explanation in physics, and in two steps. First, some causal derivations fail to be 
explanatory. They may satisfy (1) and (2) above, and they may have significant predictive or 
heuristic value, but they do not explain. Second, where a causal derivation is explanatory, it 
is never merely by virtue of satisfying (1) and (2); rather, explanation requires that the causal 
story be integrated with a global model of broad scope and explanatory power. 
According to Woodward, what makes the causal generalization G in (1) explanatory is 
that it answers “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and it does this by supporting 
the correct counterfactuals about what would happen under interventions. Consider 
Woodward’s example of the explanation of the period of a pendulum, but this time prior to 
Galileo’s theoretical advances. Taking liberties with the actual historical order of events, 
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imagine (counterfactually) that Galileo had conducted his years of painstaking experimental 
observations of pendulums first, in advance of any other work on his new science of 
mechanics. Had he arrived at his pendulum law (3) and his idealized pendulum model this 
way, we would be inclined to say that his argument deriving the period of a pendulum is not 
explanatory. The pendulum model on its own supports a relevant and approximately correct 
set of counterfactual claims about interventions on a physical pendulum. Nonetheless, it 
would be merely a phenomenological or data model, as contemporary physicists would put it. 
It fits a given set of data well, and it may describe the correct dependency relations in an 
isolated model, but fails to connect with other, more global models. These sorts of models 
may have predictive and heuristic power, but they do not underwrite explanations in physics.  
Unfortunately, Woodward’s account yields the result that many phenomenological 
models do come out as explanatory, and this cannot be right. Woodward posits a base 
threshold of explanatoriness, above which stands a continuum running from less deep or 
good explanations to deeper and better ones (2003, 368). The worry is that (1) and (2) set the 
threshold very low indeed: generalizations that are invariant under any intervention at all 
exceed the threshold because they answer a “what-if-things-had-been-different” question 
(2003, 369). So Woodward would certainly view the counterfactual Galileo’s standalone 
pendulum model as underwriting a bona fide explanation of the period of the pendulum. But 
we have good reason to maintain that it does not, nor do the plethora of other 
phenomenological models in physics that capture some of the dependency relations in their 
target physical systems. 
As a matter of historical fact, the pendulum law is significant for Galileo precisely 
because it is a key step in his route to the fundamental laws of his new science of mechanics. 
Galileo measured the elapsed time of an object’s vertical fall over a distance equal to the 
length of the pendulum, for various pendulum lengths (Drake 1989, xxvii). He obtained a 
constant ratio of free-fall times to time for the pendulum to swing to vertical. With the 
pendulum law and that ratio, Galileo could calculate the times for other distances of free-fall 
and then, removing pendulums entirely from the calculation, write down his famous law of 
motion: that all objects fall at the same rate, regardless of their composition or mass, and that 
objects starting at rest accelerate uniformly as they fall, i.e. their speed is proportional to the 
square of the elapsed time of fall. He found the law fit well his previous measurements of 
descents along inclined planes.  
This suggests that the idealized model pendulum gets its explanatory power by its 
integration into Galileo's new science of mechanics. In this case, it is integration of a 
particularly simple sort: Galileo took his pendulum law to follow from his more general law 
of free fall, and the idealized model pendulum is simply a special case of a more general 
model covering falling objects in general. Newton’s subsequent achievement was greatly to 
increase this integration by explaining the motions of bodies in terms of the forces acting on 
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them and providing a unified framework for all gravitational systems. The important point 
for our purposes is that it is not sufficient that the idealized pendulum model approximate the 
correct dependency relations in a physical pendulum for it to be explanatory.  
Woodward does say that successful causal explanation must include relevant dependency 
relations and answer a relevant range of “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and 
that scientists share an understanding of which interventions and which dependency relations 
are explanatorily relevant. Woodward seems to recognize that merely describing local causal 
relations is not sufficient for explanation, while perhaps not fully appreciating the 
consequences for the role of causation in explanation. The challenge is not to rule out an 
explanatory role for the absence of falling meteors. Rather, the challenge is to underwrite the 
explanatory role of dependency relations in the local pendulum model. And this can be done 
only in the context of a wider integration with a global model in physics—here Galilean (or 
even better Newtonian) mechanics.  
The point is not just that some causal derivations satisfying (1) and (2) fail to be 
explanatory, as in the contrary-to-historical-fact Galilean account of the pendulum. It is also 
that no causal derivation is explanatory merely by virtue of satisfying (1) and (2). This is 
because what makes the dependency relations described in the explanans relevant (i.e., 
explanatorily relevant) is the integration of the local model described in the explanans with a 
global model of broad scope and explanatory power. Without such integration, the local 
model will generally fail to be explanatory, no matter how accurately it represents causal 
relations in the target physical system. And as we shall now see, with such integration the 
local model will generally be explanatory—even if it fails to represents any causal relations 
in the target physical system. 
4. Causal relations are unnecessary for explanation 
Woodward allows that not all explanations in physics need be causal and notes that 
fundamental physics is an area in which explanations seem to be predominantly non-causal. 
What Woodward has in mind, in these and other sorts of physics explanations he calls non-
causal, are cases in which the notion of an intervention on a physical system is incoherent or 
inapplicable. This includes global applications of fundamental physics to the whole universe 
or to large portions of it, where the notion of a local intervention is inapplicable (2007, 91); 
explanations that appeal to alternative situations not plausibly characterized as an 
intervention, e.g., altering the dimensionality of space-time (2003, 220); and situations that 
lack the invariance or stability properties needed to define an intervention on the system 
(2007, 77). These sorts of cases, however, are merely the tip of a very large iceberg of non-
causal explanation in physics. 
The issue is that, aside from explanations in textbooks (from which Woodward’s 
examples seem to be drawn), much of the explanatory practice in physics does not fit 
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Woodward’s characterization. These are cases in which the idealized models that underwrite 
putative explanations are largely non-representative of target physical systems. So while they 
approximately model the explanandum behaviour, they do not approximate aspects of the 
physical system described in the explanans. Moreover, these models are not corrigible, in the 
sense that they cannot be refined in a theoretically justified, non-ad hoc way to bring them in 
closer agreement with the target system. The point is that these are cases of explanation in 
which physicists view the scientifically relevant claims about interventions and systematic 
patterns of dependency relations that figure in a potential explanans to be statements about a 
highly idealized model, statements that are not even approximately true of the target system 
containing the phenomenon to be explained. If the explanatory practice of contemporary 
physics is taken seriously, there are highly idealized models of significant explanatory value.  
Valuable work has been done by philosophers of physics on the possible explanatory 
roles of highly idealized models (Rueger 2001; Batterman 2002; Bokulich 2008; Batterman 
2010; Bokulich 2011). Alisa Bokulich, for instance, has argued that “fictional models” can be 
explanatory if they meet certain conditions. Bokulich focuses on semi-classical models, 
which mix classical and quantum features. These models are known not to represent 
successfully the physical system because, for example, they include quantum particles 
following definite classical trajectories. The earliest and most well-known of these models is 
Niels Bohr's model of the hydrogen atom. As Bokulich puts it, "I want to defend the view 
that despite being a fiction, Bohr’s model of the atom does in fact explain the spectrum of 
hydrogen" (Bokulich 2011, 42). Robert Batterman is interested in how highly idealized 
models explain the universality of structural features, such as the common characteristic 
shape of droplets at breakup when water drops fall from a dripping faucet. 
We can explain and understand (for large scales) why a given drop shape at breakup 
occurs and why it is to be expected. The answer depends essentially upon an appeal to the 
existence of a genuine singularity developing in the equations of motion in a finite time. 
It is because of this singularity that there is a decoupling of the breakup behaviour 
(characterized by the scaling solution) from the larger length scales such as those of the 
faucet diameter. Without a singularity, there is no scaling or similarity solution. Thus, the 
virtue of the hydrodynamic singularity is that it allows for the explanation of such 
universal behaviour. The very break-down of the continuum equations enables us to 
provide an explanation of universality (Batterman 2009, 442-443). 
Asymptotic analyses that systematically abstract away from micro details enable idealized 
models to explain underlying structural or universal features. Batterman calls these 
“asymptotic explanations” (Batterman 2002, Ch. 4). 
One option for Woodward and other proponents of causal explanation is simply to reject 
any role for highly idealized models in explanation. These are putative explanations that fail 
to meet Woodward’s requirement for causal explanation, nor do they fall under his class of 
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non-causal explanations in physics. These models are simply highly inaccurate 
representations of the physical world. One could argue that highly idealized asymptotic and 
semi-classical models have great heuristic and predictive value, but do not underwrite 
explanations. They can play no part in underwriting the true causal premises needed in an 
acceptable explanation. In my view, this kind of wholesale rejection of any role for highly 
idealized models in explanation would be a mistake. A closer look reveals a more nuanced 
and complex set of considerations.  
In the case of the Bohr model and other semi-classical models, there is no consensus 
among physicists that these models are explanatory, and rightly so. Clearly, their explanatory 
merits need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. At the very least, we have good reason 
to be skeptical that the Bohr model of the atom has any explanatory value, especially in light 
of the quite impressive explanations of the hydrogen spectrum given in terms of relativistic 
quantum theory.  
The situation with respect to asymptotic models is somewhat different. On the one hand, 
a case can be made that at least one of these models may be eliminated (in principle at least) 
in scientific explanation (Redhead 2004; Belot 2005). On the other hand, these sorts of 
models are used widely and are regarded as underwriting among the best explanations on 
offer in physics today. In addition to analyzing the use of asymptotic models to explain drop 
formation in hydrodynamics, Batterman has explored the use of asymptotic models to 
explain critical phenomena in thermodynamics and to explain the rainbow in catastrophe 
optics (Batterman 2002). Similar sorts of highly idealized, asymptotic models are accepted as 
explanatory in many areas of physics beyond those that are the focus of Batterman (and his 
critics). For instance, these sorts of models are taken to underwrite explanations of a wide 
variety of non-linear dynamical systems, from a damped, driven oscillator model of the 
human heart to gravitational waves ([self-reference omitted]).  
The gravitational waves case is particularly interesting. Physicists take themselves to 
have explained gravitational waves using Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR). 
However, even in the simplest models of binary systems that produce gravitational waves, 
the Einstein Field Equations (the equations of GTR) cannot be solved directly. The reason is 
that these are a set of coupled, nonlinear equations governing the relation between the 
distribution of matter and energy in the universe and the curvature of space-time (of which 
gravitational waves are one feature). An attempt to solve the Einstein Field Equations 
directly by applying regular perturbation methods results in divergences (infinities) in values 
for the properties of gravitational waves observable from earth. So physics takes what is by 
now a familiar strategy: replace the intractable original problem with a tractable one, called 
the post-Newtonian approximation, that makes essential use of singular perturbation theory 
and asymptotic models. The empirical results are predictions and explanations of 
gravitational wave phenomena. These phenomena have not been observed (at the time of 
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writing), but a handful of large gravitational-wave detectors should soon reach sensitivities 
high enough for direct detection of gravitational waves (Pitkin, Reid et al. 2011; [self-
reference omitted]).  
We have good reason to accept, at least provisionally, explanations in physics based on 
highly idealized models. However, I am not claiming to have presented a conclusive 
argument for doing so. Obviously, much work remains to be done. Further analysis of the 
details of Bokulich’s and Batterman’s examples is needed, and vastly more cases of putative 
explanation via highly idealized models in physics need to be examined in detail. The 
question that needs to be asked of each case is: does explanation of a phenomenon 
ineliminably require appeal to a highly idealized model in this case? Nor am I claiming that 
“model explanation” or “asymptotic explanation” are adequate normative accounts of 
explanation in physics that can underwrite this sort of explanatory practice. Rather, I am 
claiming that philosophers have good reasons to take seriously the fact that the explanatory 
practice of physics includes a large class of explanations based on highly idealized models, 
explanations that are clearly not causal on Woodward’s (nor any other plausible) account. I 
should also note that rejecting these sorts of cases wholesale as explanatory failures has as a 
consequence that physicists are massively mistaken about the explanatory merits of their 
theories and about the scope of their understanding of the natural world. This runs counter to 
Woodward’s own project of offering an account of explanation that has normative and 
descriptive elements in reflective equilibrium, an account “significantly constrained by prior 
usage, practice and paradigmatic examples” (2003, 8). 
The best option is to accept these sorts of cases as explanatory and recognize that the 
explanations fall outside the scope of causal explanation in physics. We have seen how 
Woodward allows that explanations in physics may be noncausal where the notion of an 
intervention is incoherent or inapplicable. Explanations appealing to highly idealized models 
constitute a new way in which the notion of an intervention is inapplicable. In these 
explanations, the correct counterfactual dependencies between I, X and Y may well obtain 
such that Woodward’s conditions (2)(ii) and (2)(iii) are satisfied. In other words, these cases 
fit very well Woodward’s central idea that explanations include statements of counterfactual 
dependencies describing the results of a hypothetical manipulation of variables in a model. 
However, the explanation is not causal because (i) is surely false: I does not cause X, because 
the dependency relations in the model do not correspond to or represent—even in an 
approximative way—physical dependency relations in the target system. Choosing this 
option is to acknowledge that there is a distinct, large and important class of non-causal 
explanations that have not been recognized by Woodward, nor, I suggest, by other 
proponents of causal explanation in physics. 
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5. Conclusion 
Recall that for Woodward, the notion of an intervention plays the crucial roles of 
underpinning both the truth and explanatory relevance of generalization G in the explanans 
of a successful causal explanation (1). In the context of physics, I have argued, “intervention” 
is simply not the right concept to play these roles. Even in cases where the notion of an 
intervention is coherent and applicable, it is not sufficient to meet the threshold of genuine 
explanatoriness in physics. As we have seen, what makes the dependency relations described 
in the explanans explanatorily relevant is the integration of the local model described in the 
explanans with a global model of broad scope and explanatory power. In other cases the 
notion of intervention is wholly unnecessary to underpin the truth of G, because G can be 
made true by facts about dependency relations in a model. These dependency relations are 
clearly not causal, because they are features of an idealized model that do not accurately 
represent corresponding features of the physical world.  
Among the many virtues of Woodward’s account of explanation are that it is explicitly 
model-based and that it makes explanation trace systematic patterns of dependencies rather 
than simply describing nomologically sufficient conditions. However, the argument given 
above that much successful explanation in physics involves highly idealized models counters 
Woodward’s claim that many (non-fundamental) explanations in physics are causal. I suggest 
that the argument against Woodward’s causal account tells equally strongly against other 
prominent defences of causal explanation in physics (e.g., Salmon 1984; Dowe 2000; 
Strevens 2008). There is good reason to believe that outside of textbook presentations, causal 
explanation is not as widespread in physics as its proponents have claimed. This point likely 
generalizes to other areas of science in which complex non-linear dynamical systems are 
modeled, such as biology and chemistry. These areas seem to have the same sorts of non-
reductive explanations appealing to highly idealized, partially non-representative models. If 
this is right, causal concepts are not as useful in scientific explanation as many philosophers 
currently believe, and certainly causal theories of explanation are not as successful as the 
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